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PARTISAN MONETARY POLICIES: PRESIDENTIAL
INFLUENCE THROUGH THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT*
HENRY W. CHAPPELL, JR.
THOMAS M. HAVRILESKY
ROB Roy MCGREGOR
We investigate the channels through which partisan mfluence from a Presidential administratIOn could affect monetary policy-making. Influence could be a result
of direct Presidential pressure exerted on members of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), or It could be a result of partisan conSideratIons m Presidential
appomtments to the Board of Governors. To investIgate these two channels of
mfluence, we deVise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary
policy reaction functIOns that can vary across indiVidual members of the FOMC
Our results suggest that the appomtments process IS the primary mechamsm by
which partisan differences m monetary policies anse.

The behavior of the Federal Reserve has often been modeled
using monetary policy reaction functions, which empirically link a
policy instrument, perhaps an interest rate or a monetary aggregate, to economic goal variables like inflation, output growth, and
unemployment. Under the assumption of a stable macroeconomic
structure, estimated reaction function coefficients reveal information about the weights the Fed attaches to the various goal
variables. More generally, reaction functions conveniently describe
the implicit policy rule the Fed has followed over a given sample
period. 1
Reaction functions have also been used to investigate the role
of political forces on monetary policies. Some findings support the
existence of a political business cycle pattern in which monetary

*We acknowledge the able research assistance of Ronald Gill, Jane Norton, and
Michael Nelson Helpful comments on earlier drafts were prOVided by Robert
Auerbach, Nathamel Beck, McKmley Blackburn, Jamce Boucher, Charles Evans,
DaVId Garman, John GIldea, Kevin Grier, SIU-KJ Leung, Pedro Portugal, Paul
Whitely, and two anonymous referees We have also benefited from comments
offered m semmars at Clemson Umversity, Duke Umversity, the Umversity of
North Carolina at Charlotte, the Umversity of South Carolma, and the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago FinanCial support was provided by NatIOnal Science
Foundation grants SES-9122322 and SES-9121941
1 Dewald and Johnson [1963], Reuber [1964], and Wood [1967] proVide early
applicatIOns of the reactIOn functIon techmque Abrams, Froyen, and Waud [1980]
introduce methodologiml extensIOns that have been widely adopted and are useful
in our work Barth, Sickles, and Wiest [1982], Gildea [1985], and Khoury [1990]
provide comprehensive surveys
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ease IS observed before elections. 2 A somewhat stronger case can be
made for the existence of partIsan influences from Presidential
administrations. 3 Conventional wisdom suggests that Democratic
administrations prefer "easy" monetary policies, whIle Republican
admmistrations prefer monetary "tightness" If Presidents can
influence members ofthe Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
the Fed's primary policy-making unit, then monetary policy IS
likely to shift with partisan changes in the Presidency Empirical
studies have modeled such partisan mfluences by adding a dummy
variable indicating the party of the President to monetary policy
reaction functions, or by estimating separate reaction functions for
periods of Democratic and Republican leadership. Most studies
show some systematic partisan mfluence.
The preceding argument assumes that a PresIdent's partisan
impact on monetary policy is a result of dIrect influence over
FOMC members,4 but another channel of influence IS also available. Members of the Fed's Board of Governors, who are FOMC
members, are appointed by the President. One would expect that
partisan preferences would affect the appointments process, and
evidence from analyses of FOMC voting patterns supports this
view. 5
Specifications for aggregate reaction functIOns (i.e., those
describing the behavior of the Fed as a whole) cannot easily capture
partIsan influences resulting from the appointments process. The
seven Governors serve overlapping terms of fourteen years, so
Presidents make appointments mfrequently as terms expire or as
Governors resign. ThIS implies that changes m the partisan
2 See Allen [1986], Beck [1984, 19871, Grier [19891, Laney and Willett [19831,
and Haynes and Stone [1989] for eVidence regarding a pohtlcal monetary cycle
Haynes and Stone and Gner find support for the hypothesIs of pre-electIOn
stimulus, while Allen and Laney and Willett find some eVidence that the Fed
accommodates fiscal pohcy vanatlOns that are elect orally hmed Beck rejects the
hypotheSIS of a pohtlCal monetary cycle Havnlesky 11987, 1988a, 1990a, 1990b]
finds support for a "pubhc chOice" model of the pohhcal busmess cycle, m wluch
mter-electlOn cycles are motivated by redlstnbutJve fiscal pohcles
3 See Alesma and Sachs [1988], Beck [19841, Chappell and Keech [1986,
1988], Grier and Neiman [1987], Haynes and Stone [19891, Havnlesky [19871, and
Hibbs [1987] for eVidence of partisan mfluences on the Fed
4 Beck [1982], Havrllesky [1988b], Kane [19801, and Wemtraub [1978J have
argued that Presidents have substantial mfluence over the Federal Reserve Later
m the paper we mveshgate whether Presidential Signals mfluence pohcy m ways
that are not systematically partIban
5 Puckett [1984], Woolley [1984], and Havnlesky and Gildea [1992[ provide
eVidence that Democrahc appomtees dissent more frequently m favor of ease, while
Republican appomtees dissent more frequently m favor of tightness Other studies
of dissent votmg patterns mclude Belden [1989], Canterbery [19671, Gildea [1990 I,
Havnlesky and Schweitzer [1990], and Yohe [1966J
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makeup of the FOMC follow changes in the partisan status of the
Presidential administration in a delayed, gradual, and somewhat
irregular manner. Including a dummy variable for the party of the
incumbent President in an aggregate reaction function is not likely
to fully capture partisan influences by way of the appointments
process.
In this paper we investigate the sources of partisan influence
on monetary policy-making using a technique that overcomes
limitations of the aggregate reaction function approach. We develop a method for estimating reaction function parameters that
vary across mdLV~dual members of the FOMC. Our estimates
permit us to infer whether members are directly influenced by the
partisan ideology of the current President, and whether they
systematically differ according to the party of the President who
appomted them If influence flows through both channels, we can
assess the relative importance ofthe two.
Apart from its focus on the channels of partisan influence, our
analysis is distinguished in three important ways from previous
studies that have estimated aggregate reaction functIOns or analyzed FOMC voting patterns. First, our model links policy outcomes to the reaction functions of individuals serving on the
FOMC. This linkage provides micro foundations for aggregate
reaction functions and permits an empirical appraisal of the
balance of power between the Chairman and other FOMC members. Second, by specifying variations across individuals as differences in reaction function parameters, we can control for the state
of the economy and prevailing policy stances when we assess
individuals' FOMC voting records. Some FOMC members may
have frequently dissented favoring tightness not because their
preferences were much different from other members, but because
policy was unusually "easy" during their tenures, or because
inflationary conditIOns warranted additional tightness. ThIrd, the
use of reaction fun ctions permits us to interpret differences across
individuals in terms of desired settings for a policy instrument.
Such comparisons are more meaningful indicators of pohcy preferences than dissent voting frequencies are.
Our findings will also address broader macroeconomic Issues.
Chappell and Keech [1986, 1988] and Alesma and Sachs [1988]
have proposed models m which partisan changes drive electorally
timed business cycles. In these models newly elected Presidential
administrations can alter the stance of monetary policy to reflect
their partisan preferences. Because election outcomes are uncer-
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tain, partisan shifts m monetary pohcies contain surprise elements
that produce business cycle fluctuations. However, If the appointments process provides the major channel of partisan influence,
then shifts in monetary policies will lag the election and dimimsh
the importance of election surprises. A finding to this effect would
undermine these models of partisan political business cycles.
We begin in Section I by describing our model and the method
used to estimate it. The data employed and the empirical specification are presented in Section II. Empirical results are presented in
Section III, and extensions are discussed in Section IV. Section V
offers conclusions.
I. A MODEL OF FOMe DECISION MAKING

FOMe members' votes on monetary pohcy directives are
observable, but these votes do not directly reveal individuals' most
preferred policies. As a result, previous studies have not attempted
to estimate conventional policy reaction functions for individuals.
Here we develop a model of FOMe decision making that permits
reaction function parameters to vary across committee members
and that can be estimated using available macroeconomic tIme
series and FOMe voting records. 6 Our presentation in thIS section
proceeds by discussmg the specification of policy preferences of
individual FOMe members, the linkage between those preferences
and resulting policy outcomes, FOMe voting behavior, and issues
assocIated wIth estImation.
A. Individuals' Reactwn Functions
As in aggregate reaction function analyses, we must designate
a specific variable as the policy instrument controlled by the Fed.
We have chosen the Federal funds rate for that purpose ThIS
choice could be challenged on the grounds that the Fed is unable to
manipulate the funds rate or that it has chosen alternative targets.
However, most observers agree that the Fed has targeted the funds
rate with considerable success over the postwar period. 7 Some have
6 Tootell [1991a, 1991 b 1has estimated mdlvldual-level reactIOn functIOns, but
the dependent varIable in hIS reactIon functIOns IS a categOrIcal varIable based on
FOMe votes HIS varIable deSCrIbes a member's preferred polIcy m relatIOn to
current polIcy (1 e , tighter, eaSler, or no change) In contrast, we estImate mdlvldual
reactIOn functIOns that speCIfy a deSIred settmg for a polIcy mstrument as the
dependent varIable, as do most aggregate reactIOn functIOn studIes
7 Most empIrIcal studIes show that, at a mmImum, the Fed has attempted to
mfluence short-run mterest rates over most of the perIod studIed m thIS paper In
reactIOn functIOn contexts Beck [1982] and FaIr [1984] prOVIde confirmmg eVIdence
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even argued that the funds rate remained a target during the
1979-1982 interlude when the Fed ostensibly adopted a nonborrowed reserve operating procedure. For example, Goodfriend [1990]
reports that "except for the period from 1934 to the end of the
1940s when short term interest rates were near zero or pegged, the
Fed has always employed either a direct or an indirect Federal
funds rate policy instrument."
We specify individuals' reaction functions so that partisan
differences across FOMC members can be represented very simply.
We assume that each of the N members of the FOMC (excluding
the Chairman) has a desired interest rate reaction function of the
following form: 8
K

(1)

rft = ao

J

+ ~ aJJkLl + ~ l3.rX;t + e a ,
k=l

;=1

i = 1, ... , N; t = 1, ... , T.
The dependent variable r~t is member i's desired Federal funds rate
for the intermeeting period following meeting t. This variable is
unobserved. The independent variables ~t,j = 1, ... , J, are those
that vary over time but not across individuals. Among these are
forecast values of macroeconomic variables of concern to the Fed
(e.g., inflation, unemployment, and growth). The ~t also include
dummy variables to indicate the partisan identity of the current
President, which should capture the effects of systematic partisan
influence from the President and the executive branch in general.
The remaining independent variables D klt , k = 1, ... , K vary
across both members and time. Specifically included are dummy
variables indicating Governors appointed by Republican and Democratic Presidents, which capture partisan influences channeled
through the power of appointment. The model could be generalized
to include other measures of individual characteristics or individualspecific dummies, but here we limit our attention to partisan
distinctions.
Note that the parameters in (1) are not subscripted by i; we
assume that differences between members are completely deCook and Hahn [1989], by exarmmng interest rate reactions to changes In Fed
target rates, show that the Fed Influences not only the Federal funds rate but also
longer term interest rates Bernanke and Bhnder [1992] prOVIde eVIdence that
movements In the funds rate are pnmarlly a consequence of Fed pohcles rather than
money demand shifts, and they also argue that the funds rate IS the best predIctor of
future movements of real macroeconomIC variables
8. When there are no vacanCIeS or absences on the FOMC, N = 11
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scribed by intercept shifts captured by the coefficients of the
partisan appointment variables. While this characterization of
differences is restrictive, data limitations argue against ncher
distinctions.
We specify a sImilar desired mterest rate reaction functlOn for
the Chairman (who is mdicated by the position index 0) which
differs only slightly from that for other FOMC members:
M

(2)

rbt = 00 +

L

J

OmCmt

+

m=l

L

f3;A;t + eot.

t

1, ... , T.

=

j~l

The partisan appointment dummies of equation (1) are replaced m
equation (2) by a senes of dummy variables, Cmt, m = 1,
. , M,
indIcating specific Chairmen (e.g., Volcker, MIller, etc.). ThIS
specificatlOn is more general than one that would require each
Chairman's intercept to match those of other members falhng
under the same partisan appointment category GIven the special
mfluence often attributed to the Chairman, and glVen the small
number of Chairmen serving in our sample period, this generalization seems appropriate. Because some Chairmen have been appointed by Presidents of both parties, the proper coding of partisan
attachments would be questionable in any case. We continue to
assume that coefficients of other variables in the reaction function
are Identical for Chmrmen and other members.
Error terms for the reaction functions (1) and (2) are assumed
to be identically distributed normal random variables that are
un correlated over time and across indivlduals: 9
E(e ,t )

=

0,

E(e~) =

E(e,tejs)

for

(T2,

=

0,

l

for

=
l

0, ... ,N, t
;c J

or t

;c

=

1, .. , T;

s.

B. Monetary Policy ChOlces and FOMC Votlng
Monetary pohcy directives are adopted by a majonty vote of
the FOMC at regularly scheduled meetings of the commIttee In
these meetings the discussion of monetary policy typically begins
with the presentation of a staff report that assesses current
macroeconomic conditions and provides forecasts under alternative policy scenarios. This is followed by the policy "go-around" m
whlCh individual FOMC members present additlOnal mformatlOn
9 A generahzahon permlttlllg correlated errors across members at a moment
time IS dIscussed III note 32 ExtenSIOns IllvestIgatlllg pOSSIble senal correlatIOn
are dIscussed bnefly III note 19 and more thoroughly III an appendIX avaIlable from
the authors
III
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and broach policy strategies. The Chairman (or occasionally a
member designated by the Chairman) then suggests a proposal for
the monetary poliey directive. If further discussion indicates that
this proposal is deemed suitable by a majority of the voting
committee members, then final language for the directive is
crafted, and a formal vote is taken. In practice, formal votes are
taken only when approval by a majority is assured. The language of
policy directives is intentionally vague, but our assumption is that
the directive implicitly embraces a target for the Federal funds
rate. At times the target has been explicit.
The Chairman plays key roles in FOMC deliberations as a
consensus builder and as an agenda setter. By all accounts the Fed
places a high value on consensus, and the Chairman must orchestrate that consensus. However, by mindfully choosing his proposed
policy directive, the Chairman may be able to tilt policy choices in a
direction he favors. Woolley [1984] has suggested that the Chairman may also gain some leverage over the committee through his
functions as a liaison between the Fed and the outside world and as
an internal allocator of Fed resources. In recognition of his
distinctive sway over monetary policy, some have referred to the
Chairman as the second most powerful man in Washington. lO
We believe, therefore, that it is appropriate to model the
Chairman as proposing a target for the Federal funds rate on which
the committee votes.l1 To reflect both the consensus-building and
agenda-setting roles of the Chairman in a tractable formulation,
our model specifies that his proposed funds rate r t be a weighted
average of his own desired rate and the mean desired rate of all
other members:

(3)

1/12 :s 'Y :s 1.0,

where

(4)

r*t

(~) ~>*

= N

<=1

<t

and 'Y is the weight attached to the Chairman's desired interest
rate. We assume that the Chairman has at least as much influence
as other members (-y ;::: 1/12), and permit the possibility that he is
10. In an annual rankmg of powerful indIVlduals, U S. News and World Report
hsted Federal Reserve Chrurman Paul Volcker in second place, behInd only the
PresIdent [U. S. News and World Report, May 10,1982]
11 The Ch81rman has a formal vote, but SInce none has ever dIssented we
regard his votIng as superfluous.
'
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dictatorial (-y = 1.0). Since the Chairman's proposed funds rate is
ultimately adopted, r t is observed in the postmeeting period.
Once the Chairman has proposed a Federal funds rate target
to the committee, the remaming members can dissent in favor of
"ease," dissent in favor of "tightness," or assent. The discrete
variable Va, referring to the vote by member i in meetmg t, is
defined to equal -1, 1, or 0 in these three cases. 12 Because of
internal pressures to present a united external front, members are
apparently reluctant to dissent; they do so only when dIsagreements are acute. 13 Accordingly, we assume that a member dissents
only when the difference between the proposed Federal funds rate
and his desired rate exceeds a threshold level '1\ > O.
(5a)
(5b)
(5c)

ifrt - rit > '1\,
ifrt - rit < -'1\,
if - '1\ ~ r t - rii ~ '1\,

then V,t = -1;
then V,[ = 1;
then v,[ = O.

Condition (5a) says that if the proposed rate exceeds his
desired rate by more than '1\ units, then member i wIll dissent
favoring ease. Similarly, (5b) says that if the proposed rate is less
than his desired rate by more than '1\ units, then member l will
dissent favoring tightness. Finally, (5c) says that if the difference
12 The Record of Polley Actwns for FOMC meetmgs bnefly describes members' reasons for dlssentmg votes In all but a few cases, these explanatIOns can be
coded to mdlcate dissents favormg ease or tightness For example, at the FOMe
meetmg held on August 20, 1985, Reserve Bank President Robert Black dissented
"
because he preferred to direct open market operatIOns promptly toward a
somewhat greater degree of reserve restramt and thereby Improve the prospects of
moderatmg M1 growth to wlthm the Committee's range for the second half of the
year" ["Record of PolIcy ActIOns of the Federal Open Market Committee," Federal
Reserve Bulletm, LXXI, December 1985, p. 954] Black IS accordmgly coded as
havmg dissented for tightness At the same meetmg Governor Martha Seger
dissented"
because she favored some reductIOn m the degree of reserve restramt
m lIght of the finanCial vulnerabilIty of some sectors of the economy and m order to
encourage sustamed economic expansIOn" [Federal Reserve Bulletm, 1985, p 954J
Seger IS accordmgly coded as havmg dissented for easE'
13 Henry Wallich has Said, "It IS not a pleasant thmg to have to keep
dlssentmg
One dissents less frequently than you would thmk After all, you are a
member of a group and you want to get along With the other members" [Greider,
1987, p 201] Nancy Teeters vOices Similar ImpreSSIOns "Once a consensus IS
formed, there IS a very strong temptatIOn to fall mIme" [Greider, 1987, p 221]
Preston Martm says. "Unless you were there, an 'mslder,' you cannot comprehend
the power at play m consensus bUlldmg, the frustratIOn at times m acceptmg those
deCISIOns for the sake of market stabilIty, and the compellmg case at other hmes for
dissent and even for takmg your vote public for reasons of conscience" [Wall Street
Journal, August 5, 1987J The FOMC's Memoranda ofDlscusswn for Apn118, 1972
[p 467], prOVides an even more revealmg diSCUSSIOn of the calculus of votmg m
reportmg the comments of Alfred Hayes "Mr Hayes Said he was reluctant to vote
affirmatively because he was dissatisfied With the proposed course He planned to do
so, however, because the difference of view was not suffiCiently great to warrant hiS
castmg a russentmg vote "
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between desired and proposed rates is less than A in absolute value,
then member i assents.
We next consider estimation of the model. Parameters to be
estimated include not only reaction function coefficients for Chairmen and members, but also "(, the weight attached to the Chairman's preferences in the policy process, and A, the threshold
parameter for dissent voting.

C. Estimation of the Model
Substituting (1), (2), and (4) into (3) yields a reduced-form
equation for the postmeeting Federal funds rate:
M

(6)

r t = "(8 0

+

(1 - "()uo

+ "(

J

L8

m C mt

+

m~1

L ~J~t

J~1

K

+ (1

- "()

L

UkDkt

+ "(eOt +

(1 -

"(Yet,

k~1

where
and
This equation contains only exogenous variables; its reduced-form
coefficients can be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS). Moreover, OLS can provide direct estimates of the ~kS (the
coefficients of economic variables and the current President partisan dummies). Assuming that "( ;t!; 1.0, one can also test the null
hypothesis of no partisan appointment effects (i.e., that Oi.k = 0 for
k = 1, ... , K). It is not possible to identify all of the structural
parameters in (6) from its reduced-form estimates, 14 but additional
information is provided by the voting behavior of individual FOMC
members.
Again considering voting behavior, we substitute (1) and (6)
into conditions (5) to obtain
M

(7a)

if "(80 + (1 - "()Oi.o - 01.0 + "(

L

K

OmCmt

+ (1 - "()

m=l

L

UkDkt

k=l

K

-L

UkDht

+ ,,{eOt +

(1 -

,,{Yet - e,t >

A,

then V,t

=

-1;

k=l

14 We can estImate M + J + K + 1 reduced-form coeffiCIents by OLS
estimatIOn of (6), but the equatIOn mcludes M + J + K + 3 structural parameters.
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M

(7b)

If 'YOo + (1 - 'Y)<Xo - <Xo + 'Y

K

L

OmCmt

+ (1 -

m=1

'Y)

L

<XkDkt

k=1

K

-L

<XkDk,t

+ 'YeOt +

k=1

(1 - 'Y)et - elf

< -A,

then V,t

= 1;

then Vzt

=

M

(7c)

if -A

S;

'Yoo

+

+ (1 -

(1 - 'Y)

+

'Y)<Xo - <Xo

'Y

K

K

k=1

k=1

L

omCmt

L <XkDkt - L <XkDk,t + 'YeOt
+ (1 -

'Y)et - e,t S; A,

o.

Conditions (7) characterize a reduced-form ordered probIt model. 15
If we normalize in the standard fashion for probit models by setting
the variance of the composite error term equal to an arbitrary
constant, then reduced-form coefficients of (7) can be estImated
using voting data for member i. 16 Since the <XkS can be estimated,
the reduced-form probit model provides an alternative test of
partisan appointment effects.
Given reduced-form estimates of both (6) and (7), and given
restrictions relating error variances and covariances across equations, all of the model's structural parameters can be identIfied.
Even the conventional normahzation of the probit equation error
variance is not required, since cross-equation restrIctions identify
that parameter. Methods analogous to indirect least squares (lLS)
could be used to infer structural parameters from reduced-form
estimates, but ILS can yield a multiplicity of estimates, depending
upon WhICh identifying restrictions are imposed in solving for
structural parameters. Statistical testing is also problematic under
ILS.
Full informatIOn maximum likelihood (FIML) methods provide an alternative technique for estimating systems of equations
with limited dependent variablesY Because of the complexity of
15 McKelvey and Zavoma [1975] describe the ordered probit model and
prOVide an applicatIOn to roll-call votmg m the U S Congress
16 The parameters of (7) can be estimated usmg a data set contammg the vote
of Just one member per meetmg. Poolmg over members and time to estimate (7)
would also be possIble, but the statistical propertIes of the estimates would be
questIOnable because reduced-form errors are correlated across members withm a
meetmg
17 Heckman [1978J and Maddala [1983] desCribe FIML estimation techniques
for such models Instrumental variables methods like those proposed by Nelson and
Olsen [1978] can also be used to estimate probit models WIth endogenous explanatory varIables One dIsadvantage of the mstrumental varIables methods IS that they
fail to make use of cross-equation restrictIOns like those Implied by our model
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computing multiple integrals of multivariate normal distribution
functions, FIML is feasible only when the number of limited
dependent variables in the system is small. In the model considered
here, twelve variables are determined in a typical meeting of the
FOMC-the postmeeting Federal funds rate and the discrete votes
of eleven FOMC members-making FIML estimation impractical.
A related technique based on the maximum likelihood method
is feasible, however. A special feature of our model is that the
probit equations determining members' votes within a meeting are
identical across individuals; individual differences are captured by
the series of partisan appointment dummies. Consequently, to
estimate all model parameters, we need only estimate a model
including one equation determining the Federal funds rate and one
of eleven identical voting equations. The maximum likelihood
method can be applied to the estimation of such a two-equation
system. (Appendix 1 presents the likelihood function for this
model.) To do so, we employ voting observations for one member
per meeting, while discarding the votes of others. This does not
make use of all available data, but it does impose all cross-equation
restrictions; it can also be repeated using alternative sets of voting observations. For each set of estimates, hypotheses can be
tested using conventional statistics based upon the likelihood
function.
To carry out the estimation, we proceed in the following way.
1. For each meeting randomly draw, and assign position
numbers 1 through 11 across members (without replacement). Specific individuals can be assigned different position numbers in different meetings.
2. Estimate structural parameters in (6) and (7) jointly by the
maximum likelihood method, using only the over-time
voting observations for members assigned the position
number 1.
3. Repeat step 2 separately for members assigned the position
numbers 2, 3, ... , 11.
4. Compute mean values of the estimates for each parameter
over the eleven sets of estimates.
This procedure will produce eleven separate sets of consistent
estimates for the model's parameters; the means of consistent
estimates are also consistent.
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II.

THE EMPIRICAL

MODEL

We now consider the empirical counterparts to equations (1)
and (2). The individuals' and ChaIrmen's reaction functions are
specified below:
(I')

(2')

0:0 + O:DApDAPa + O:RAPRAPa + O:ssAPSSAP,t + I3 Dcp DCP t
+ I3 RcpRCPt + I3 r rt - l + I3M1 Ml t- 1 + I3PPt + l3u Ut + I3IP IPt + e,t·
r~ =

rOt

= 00 + OVOLCKER VOLCKERt + oMILLERMILLERt
+ 0BuRNsBURNSt + I3 Dcp DCPt + I3 RcpRCP t + I3 r r t - 1
+ I3M1 Ml t - 1 + I3 PPt + l3u Ut + I3Ip IPt + eat·

For Governors, equation (I') includes three dummy variables
to indicate the partisan identification of the appointing President.
Conventionally one would identify Governors as either Republican
or Democratic appointees, but Havrilesky and Gildea [1991b, 1992]
have found that the "supply-side" appointees of Ronald Reagan
differ notably from the appointees of other Republican Presidents.
Most studies have suggested that Republicans lean toward monetary tightness, but the Reagan appointees have been strong
advocates of monetary ease. Greider [1987] concurs in his historical account, attributing the move toward easier policy in the
mid-1980s to the influence of the Reagan appointees. We therefore
define the three dummy variables DAP, RAP, and SSAP to mdicate
Democratic appointees, traditional (i.e., non-Reagan) Republican
appointees, and supply-side (i.e., Reagan) Republican appointees.
Regional Bank Presidents are represented m the intercept The
Chairman's equation adds dummies for Chairmen Paul Volcker, G.
William Miller, and Arthur Burns (with Wilham McChesney
Martin accounted for in the intercept) and drops the partisan
dummies.
The President's direct partisan influence IS captured in the
DCP and RCP dummy variables in each equatlOn. These dummies
indicate that the current President is a Democrat or a traditlOnal
Republican (with the supply-side current President represented in
the intercept). Note that our model includes the conventional
two-party classification as a special case in which the coefficients of
RAP and SSAP are equal and the coefficient of RCP is zero.
Other independent variables in the two equations include
economic indicators conventionally appearing in reaction functions To capture inertia in the policy process, the reaction
functions include the last period's Federal funds rate rt-l (the
average rate prevailing between meetings t - 1 and t) as an
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explanatory variable. IS Accounting for inertial effects in this fashion also reduces the potential for serial .correlation of reaction
function errors.l 9 Lagged money growth M1 t - I (calculated as the
growth rate of the M1 money stock over the two months preceding
the meeting) enters the model because the money stock has often
been an explicit intermediate target. 20 The re!llaining economic
variables are forecasts of "goal" variables, P (the annualized
percentage rate of inflation based on the Consumer ~rice Index), U
(the percentage civilian unemployment rate), and IP (the annualized percentage rate of growth in the Federal Reserve's Index of
Industrial Production).21 The forecasts are computed on the basis
of data available in the month preceding the month in which
meeting t occurs and have a three-month-ahead forecasting horizon. Our use of forecasts of target variables and our method of
calculating these forecasts follow closely the example of Abrams,
Froyen, and Waud [1980].22 In addition to these explanatory
18 The hkehhood functIOn for the model presented m AppendIx 1 does not
specifically account for the presence of a lagged dependent variable If one assumes
that the last pre-sample observatIOn of the funds rate IS nonrandom, the hkehhood
function we present IS appropriate EstImates wIll be consIstent m any case
19 If our model IS altered to permIt first-order serial correlation of the errors
in mdlvldual reaction functions, then serIal correlatIOn wIll also be present m (6),
the reduced-fonn equation explainmg the mterest rate Moreover, the serial
correlation coefficIent for the reduced-fonn errors will approximate that for the
mdlVldual's reactIon functIons We find that estlmatlOn of (6) by the Hiidreth-Lu
method provides eVIdence of modest first-order serIal correlatIon, wIth a correlatIOn
coefficIent p = 0.28 for the model correspondmg to Table I III the text Although the
assumptIon that p = 0 can be rejected, correctmg for serial correlatIOn m (6) does
not substantIvely alter the results of that equatIOn
We have also estimated the model usmg data that have been transformed by
generalIzed dIfferencmg The results are almost Identical to those reported here,
and the transformation does ehmmate eVIdence of serial correlatIOn m (6). WhIle
transformmg the data does not strictly correct for serIal correlation in the context of
our model, it does prOVIde eVIdence that findlllgs are robust m a more general
dynamIC specIficatIOn III whIch serIal correlatIOn is less lIkely to be present Further
detaIls are aVaIlable m an appendIX aVaIlable from the authors We also find that our
results are robust to other alternatIve specificatIOns of the model's dynamiCs
20 Hakes and Gamber [1992] support the conclUSIOns of Abrams, Froyen, and
Waud III findmg that the Fed responded to deVIatIOns of actual from targeted money
growth prIOr to 1982
21 Following other reactIOn functIOn studIes, we also conSIdered exchange
rates and balance of payments measures as pOSSible explanatory varIables Like
most of those studIeS, we find lIttle eVIdence that mternatIonal varIables have
consIstently mfiuenced monetary pohcy
22 Our forecasts are predIcted values from "rolling" regressIOn equatIOns
explammg each of the three target varIables The regressIOns employed samples of
60 monthly observations prIor to the forecast penod Each forecastmg equatIOn
mcluded lagged values of the unemployment rate, the rate of mfiatIon, the rate of
growth of mdustnal productIOn, the growth rate of Ml, and the federal budget
defiCIt as a fractIOn of GNP Lag lengths of up to three months were permItted for
mcluded variables, WIth lag lengths chosen separately for the lagged dependent
variable and for all other variables (as a grou~) The final lag speCIficatIon was
selected on the baSIS of maximum adjusted R for a regression over the entIre
sample perIod
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variables, estimation of the model requires data for the actual
postmeeting Federal funds rate, which is measured as the average
rate prevailing between meetings t and t + 1.23 (A summary of
variable definitions is provIded in Appendix 2.)
Our data consist of macroeconomIC variables and individual
voting records linked to 349 regular meetings 24 of the FOMC over
the 1960-1987 period. 25 At a given meetmg, the voting members of
the FOMC include the seven members of the Board of Governors
and five of the regional Reserve Bank Presidents. After excluding
the votes of the Chairman (whom our model treats as an agenda
setter) and dropping observations assocIated wIth vacancIes, absences, and several uncodable dissents, the data set includes 3631
individual voting observations.
One further empirical issue requires prelimmary attention.
We have argued that the Federal funds rate is appropriately viewed
as the Fed's primary policy instrument over most of the sample
period, but operating procedures have sometimes varied. Of particular significance is the regime of nonborrowed reserve targeting
adopted in October 1979 and employed through September 1982.
Over this period the Fed paId more attention to the behavior of
monetary aggregates and permitted much larger funds rate fluctuations than it did in previous or subsequent periods. In preliminary
empirical work our results confirmed shifts in policy rules and
voting behavior in the 1979-1982 period. Because policy-making in
this period does not conform well to our assumption that the funds
rate is the key instrument, we have decided to exclude these
meetings from further analysis (although key findings on partisan
influences are in fact robust to their inclusion).26 We retain a
23 AlternatIvely, we have measured the postmeetmg mterest rate as the rate
prevallmg m the first complete week after the FOMC meetmg Results are
essentIally unaffected by thIs change m the specIficatIOn
24 Our sample excludes telephone meetmgs, for whIch votmg mformatlOn IS
not complete over the sample period Phone meetmgs were more frequent, and
ordmary meetmgs less frequent m the latter portIon of the penod, however, the
average frequency ofmeetmgs IS roughly monthly for the complete sample penod
25 Havnlesky [1993) suggests that polItIcal mfluences on monetary pohcy
were lImIted before 1961 Moreover, because the nature of the FOMC dIrectIve
changed m 1959 to mdlcate more gradual adjustments m monetary polIcy, the
meanmg of dIssents probably dIffered m the pre- and post-1960 penods Our sample
also excludes the final four meetmgs m 1987, whIch occurred after Alan Greenspan
became the ChaIrman
26 We found that several key parameters dIffered m the 1979-1982 perIod
The reactIOn functIOn error varIance, ()'2, was larger, as was the dissent threshold
parameter, A These results mdlcate greater variabIlIty m deSIred mterest rates as
well as greater tolerance of deViatIOns between deSIred and proposed rates when
contemplatmg dIssents Lagged money growth also had a larger coeffiCIent durmg
that penod, whIch IS conSIstent WIth the findmgs of Fall r 1984J Each of the~e
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sample of 3352 voting observations obtained from 323 FOMe
meetings, including 99 (3.0 percent) dissents favoring ease, 137
(4.1 percent) dissents favoring tightness, and 3116 (93.0 percent)
assents.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table I summarizes results obtained from estimating the
empirical model. Our procedure initially produces eleven estimates
for each parameter; the table presents the mean estimate and the
mean standard error for each parameter. 27 Sign frequencies record
the number of times (out of eleven) that a parameter was positive
or negative, and sIgnificance frequencies record the number of
times (out of eleven) that each parameter differed significantly
from zero at the 0.10 level. In the bottom panel ofthe table, similar
significance frequencies are reported for tests involving comparisons of coefficients. Single-equation estimates of the reduced-form
equations for this specification have also been estimated and are
reported in Appendix 3. 28
The results appear to give a clear answer to the question we
have posed on the channels of partisan influence. The mean
coefficients indicate that, other things equal, traditional Republican appointees prefer a Federal funds rate 0.50 points higher than
Democrats, who in turn prefer rates 1.13 points higher than
supply-side Republicans. The difference between traditional Republicans and Democrats was significant (at the 0.10 level or better) in
ten of the eleven individual estimations, while Democrats and
results is mtUltlvely plaUSible gIVen the change m operatmg procedures. We find
that once these shifts are allowed for, our findmgs on partisan mfluences are
essentially unchanged from those reported m the text
27 Standard errors are calculated by the method of White [1982], producmg
estImates that are robust to some speCificatIOn errors The average standard errors
we report are almost surely larger than the true standard errors of the average
coeffiCients, thus, our mferences about statistical Significance are conservative.
Standard errors for the mean estimates could til prmclple be obtained through
bootstrappmg procedures, but computatIOnal costs are prohIbitive Usmg the
general purpose maximum hkelihood routme in TSP, the estimatIOn reported m
Table I reqUlred over seven hours of CPU tIme on an IBM 4381 mml-mainframe
computer
28 We have estImated reduced-form equatIOns for other speCIfications developed III the paper, complete results of those estimatIOns are presented m an
appendIX aVaIlable from the authors upon reque.st. Results from the reduced-form
estImations are m all cases consistent WIth those denved from the Jomt estImatIOn
procedure In addItion, we have employed a smgle-equatlOn ordered probit model to
estimate the structural parameters of (7) under the (unrealistic) assumption that
the adopted interest rate IS exogenous. Although these estimates are subject to a
simuitam'lty bIas, they produce results conSIstent WIth our findmgs on partisan
influences These results are also aVaIlable from the authors upon request.
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TABLE I
MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTIONS WITH PARTISAN INFLUENCES

Parameter /varIable

Mean
Mean
standard
Sign
Significance
coefficient error frequency frequency-"

Chairman's parameters
'I (Chairman's votmg weight)
00 (constant)
OVOLCKER
OMILLER
1iBURNS
Individuals' parameters
'" (dissent threshold parameter)
ao (constant)
aDAP (Democratic appointee)
aRAP (Republican appomtee)
aSSAP (supply-side appomtee)
Shared parameters
a (error standard deViatIOn)
(3r (lagged funds rate)
(3MI (M1 growth)
(3p (mfiatlOn)
(3zp (mdustnal productIOn growth)
(3u (unemployment)
(3DCP (Democratic current PreSident)
(3RcP (Republican current PreSident)
Additional tests of hypotheses
Null hypotheSIS
'I-\,i2=0
"'DAP - aRAP = 0
"'RAP - "'SSAP = 0
"'SSAP - "'DAP = 0
(3DCP - (3RCP = 0
OVOLCKER - OBURNS = 0
OVOLCKER - OMILLER = 0
OMILLER - 1iBURNS = 0

RejectIOn frequency"
1/11
10/11
11/11
9/11
1/11
1/11
0/11
0/11

a The level of slgmficance

l~

01579
04193
18842
05956
-06224

00949
11301
24719
12703
07029

11/11+
10/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/11-

5/11+
0/11
0/11
0/11
1/11-

2 1524
14839
-07814
-02804
-19119

02125
0.4493
0.2600
02786
05362

11/11 +
11/11 +
11/1110/1111/11-

11/11+
11/11+
11/115/1111/11-

11299
09336
00081
00620
00195
-01205
-04221
-03574

00949
00202
00045
00161
00043
0.0311
0.2837
0.2840

11/11 +
11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/1111/1111/11-

11/11+
11/11+
8/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/113/113/11-

0 10

supply-siders differed significantly in nine of eleven cases and
Republicans and supply-siders differed significantly in all eleven
cases. These results provide strong evidence of the importance of
the power of appointment in Presidential influence over monetary
policy.
Evidence of direct partisan influence from the President is
much weaker. A comparison of the coefficients of DCP and RCP
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indicates that individuals prefer a funds rate just 0.07 points lower
while serving under Democrats than under Republicans. These
coefficients differed significantly only once in eleven estimations.
There is slightly stronger evidence of a shift in policy preferences
under the supply-side President. Coefficients of DCP and RCP are
consistently negative and are significantly different from zero in
three of eleven cases. This indicates that members preferred higher
interest rates when serving under the supply-side President than
when serving under Democrats or traditional Republicans. Thus,
the direct and appointment-induced impacts of the supply-side
President appear to have worked in opposite directions.
The preceding result senSIbly matches the historical record.
During the first Reagan administration, monetarists and conservatives, including Beryl Sprinkel at the Treasury and Martin Feldstein at the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), directly signaled
administration preferences for monetary tightness. After 1984
administration supply-siders gained the upper hand as Treasury
Secretary Donald Regan shifted his stance and as key personnel
changes occurred at the Treasury, the CEA, and the Federal
Reserve Board. Signaling subsequently decreased as the power of
appointment became the main vehicle for executive branch influence over the Fed; the post-1984 Reagan appointees to the Board
led a movement toward easier monetary policies.
Although our results strongly indicate that the distinction
between traditional Republicans and supply-siders is appropriately
made, we have also estimated the model for the special case in
which these groups are combined. These results, provided in Table
II, still show some evidence of party differences, with Republican
appointees preferring tighter policies. However, both the magnitude of the estimated difference and the frequency of significance
decline; the average difference was 0.25 interest rate points, and
the difference was significant in just three of eleven estimations.
The results again indicate that direct systematic partisan influence
from the current President is negligible.
The results in Tables I and II are similar in most other
respects. We find that economic conditions are related to the
setting of the Fedl~ral funds rate in a manner consistent with the
results of most previous reaction function studies. The lagged
funds rate has a large positive coefficient, indicating the presence of
inertia in the policy-making process The coefficient of lagged
money growth is also positive and is usually significant, consistent
with the role of money growth as an intermediate target. Coeffi-
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TABLE II
REACTION FUNCTIONS WITH REPUBLICANS AND SUPPLy-SIDERS COMBINED

Parameter /vartable

Mean
Mean
standard
Sign
Significance
coefficIent error frequency frequencya

Chairman's parameters
(Ch81rman's votmg weight)
00 (constant)
OVOLCKER
OMILLER
OBURNS
IndivIduals' parameters
A (dIssent threshold parameter)
ao (constant)
aDAP (DemocratIc appomtee)
aRAP (RepublIcan appomtee)b
aSSAP (supply-sIde appomtee)b
Shared parameters
a (error standard deViatIon)
i3r (lagged funds rate)
13M! (M1 growth)
i3p (inflatIon)
i3IP (mdustnal productIOn growth)
i3u (unemployment)
i3DCP (DemocratIc current PresIdent)
AddItIonal tests of hypotheses
Null hypothesIs
'1- Y,Z = 0
aDAP - aRAP = 0
OYOLCIG<;R - OBURNS = 0
OYOLCKER - /)MILLER = 0
/)MILLER - /)BURNS = 0

RejectIOn frequencya
3/11
3/11
6/11
0/11
0/11

'I

01971
0.1570
08449
01277
-07723

0.0828
06590
09603
0.7841
06238

11/11+
10/11+
11/11+
7/11+
11/11-

9/11+
0/11
0/11
0/11
1/11-

20572
07492
-06907
-04473
-04473

02190
02360
02458
02661
02661

11/11+
11/11+
11/1110/1110/11-

11/11+
11/11+
9/116/116/11-

1.0995
09518
00077
00608
0.0221
-00769
-0.0378

01570
00187
00044
00138
00042
00244
00497

11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/1111/11-

11/11+
11/11+
8/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/110/11

a The level of slgmficance 1., 0 10
b (tRAP and ClSSAP are constramed to be equal

cients for the forecasts of inflation and industrial production are
positive and that for unemployment is negative, as one would
expect if the Fed attempts to stabilize the business cycle. Coefficients of each of the three forecast variables differ significantly
from zero in each ofthe estimations underlying Tables I and II.
Our results confirm previous studies that have suggested that
Governors and Bank Presidents behave differently.29 In Table I the
29 Puckett [1984] and Woolley [1984J report that Bank Presidents have
dissented more frequently m favor of tIghtness than Governors Havnlesky and
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negative coefficients of DAP, RAP, and SSAP indicate that Democratic, Republican, and supply-side Governors all prefer a lower
funds rate than Bank Presidents (who are represented in the
intercept). These differences were sIgnificant in all eleven estimations for Democrats and supply-siders, and in five of eleven cases
for Republicans. Similar results prevail in Table II.
The estimates also reveal information about the preferences of
Chairmen. The estimated intercepts of the various Chairmen differ
by large amounts, but standard errors are also large, and statistically significant differences between Chairmen are unusual. The
ordering of preferences is nevertheless instructive. The results of
both tables show that Volcker preferred the highest funds rates,
(even though the 1979-1982 observations are deleted), followed by
Miller, Martin (in the intercept), and Burns. 3o By constructing the
appropriate composite intercepts, we can also compare Chairmen
and representative FOMC members of various types. In Table III
we report these composite intercepts in a ranking from easiest to
tightest, based on the estimates reported in Table I.
Our model is distinctive in permitting the estimation of voting
weights attached to the Chairman and to other members of the
FOMC in the decision-making process. The Chairman's weight 'Y is
estimated to be 0.158 in Table I (and it is slightly higher in Table
II).3I Assuming a full complement of eleven other FOMC members,
the implied weight. for each addit.ional member is 0.077. Thus, our
estimate indicates that the Chairman has about twice as much
voting weight as a rank and file member of the FOMC. This
parameter is not estimated very precisely, however, and in only one
of eleven estimations was 'Y significantly different from 1/ 12, the
value that would imply equal weights for the Chairman and all
others. The hypothesis that the Chairman is dictatorial ('Y = 1.0) is
consistently rejected, however.
SchweItzer [1990) report SImilar results based on the estimatlOn of a bmary probit
modeL However, Tootell [1991b) fails to find significant dIfferences between
Governors and PreSIdents based upon a multmomiallogit analysIs See Havnlesky
[1993] for a cntique of Tootell's analysis
30 Usmg aggregate reactlOn functlOns, Hakes [1990) found evidence of a shIft
m reactIOn functlOn coeffiCIents under Arthur Burns (relative to Volcker and
Martm). Belden [1989) also reports evidence of changing FOMC voting patterns
under the Burns Chairmanship, however, her findings are challenged by Havrilesky
and Glidea [1991a] Havnlesky [1993) reports that under Burns the Fed systematically responded to AdmIlllstratlOn SIgnalS for monetary ease but not to sIgnals for
tightness Thus, the apparent polley ShIftS under Burns mIght best be attnbuted to
executive branch pressures
31. We dId not Impose the constramt -y > 1/12 m the estimations summanzed
m our tables; however, estimated values for -y below 1/12 were mfrequent
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TABLE III
COMPOSITE INTERCEPTS FOR MEMBER TYPES AND CHAIRMEN

Chatrman/member type
Supply-slde Governor
Burns
Martm
Democratic Governor
Mlller
Repubhcan Governor
Bank Presldent
Volcker

Composlte intercept
ao
00

+ aSSAP
+ OBURNS

80

+ aDAP
+ OMILLER
aD + aRAP
ao

80

aD

00

+ OVOLCKER

Estimate
-043
-0.20
042
070
102
120
148
230

Table I indicates that A, the threshold parameter, equals 2.15,
implymg that dissents occur only when an individual's desired
funds rate differs from the selected rate by more than 2.15 points.
This is a large number in relation to typical shifts m postmeeting
interest rates, but it is also true that dissents are quite rare,
occurring on only 7.0 percent of all votes by non-Chairmen. If
dissents are infrequent, our model must account for that phenomenon with a high dissent threshold. 32

IV.

EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL

The results so far support the proposition that Presidents
exert systematic partisan influence on monetary policy by way of
their appointments to the Board. In contrast, direct influence from
the President, with the possible exception of Reagan-specIfic
effects, does not appear to be strongly related to partisan ideology.
In this section we consider extensions of the model m which dIrect
influence from the current President might yet play an important
role.
32. In an extenSIOn of the model, we have permltted errors to be correlated
across members at a given meetmg. A positive correlatIOn of errors across members
would provlde an alternative explanatIOn for the mfrequency of dlssents It would
suggest that dlssents occur mfrequently because members often agree with one
another, perhaps because they respond m similar ways to variables omitted from
the model Our results with the generallzed model tended to produce estimates of -y
that were ImplauSibly low (below 1/12) unless a constratnt was lmposed When-y
was constratned to equal 1 / 12, the error correlatIOn was never Significantly different
from zero Estimates for A were not much lower than those reported in Tables I and
II, although standard errors for the A estimates were conslderably larger Apparently, multicollinearity makes It difficult to dlstmgUlsh between high values for A
and correlated errors as explanations for mfrequent dlssents Results on partisan
differences with the generalized model were similar to those reported m the text
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One possibility is that influence from the President is channeled through the Chairman, but not through other FOMC
members. This hypothesis is especially plausible for two reasons.
First, the Chairman is generally acknowledged to be the FOMC's
link to external dients, including the administration. Second,
Chairmen serve only four-year terms and, to further their chances
of reappointment, may be particularly responsive to the current
President.
This hypothesis can be tested in a very simple way. We alter
the basic model to allow the coefficients of the current President
dummies, DCP and RCP, to differ for Chairmen and for all other
members. If coeffieients ofthese variables differ in the Chairman's
equation and if the Chairman has a large voting weight, we would
conclude that direct partisan Presidential influence by way of the
Chairman exists.
For the estimation reported in Table IV the coefficients ofDCP
and RCP for Chairmen are given by the sums 13DcP + 13CHMDCP and
I3RcP + I3cHMRcP (equivalently, I3cHMDcP and I3cHMRcP measure
differences in the coefficients of Chairmen and non-Chairmen). The
results for this model provide weak but suggestive evidence for the
hypothesis that the Chairman is an agent of the President. The
estimates reveal large upward shifts in the Chairman's intercept
when the President is a traditional Republican or Democrat
relative to the case where the President is a supply-sider. This
suggestion of a direct Reagan influence favoring ease through the
Chairman is compatible with the ease orientation of the Reagan
appointees, but contrasts with our finding, discussed earlier, that
the direct influence of monetarists and other nonsupply-siders in
the Reagan administration encouraged tighter policy preferences
among rank and file committee members. Given the confounding
pressures on policy during the Reagan years and the inherent
limitations of the data, one should interpret this result with
caution.
Table IV also provides weak evidence that Democratic and
Republican Presidents exert differing partisan influences through
the Chairman. The estimates imply that the Chairman's intercept
shifts upward by 0.87 points when a traditional Republican
replaces a Democrat in the White House. This is a large shift in the
expected direction, but the difference is not statistically significant
in any of the eleven estimations summarized by the table.
In a second extension ofthe model, we investigate whether the
partisan identity of the current President could matter in a
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TABLE IV
REACTION FUNCTIONS PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE VIA THE CHAIRMAN

Mean
Mean standard
SIgn
SIgnIficance
coeffiCIent error frequency frequencya

Parameter /varIable
ChaIrman's parameters
'I (ChaIrman's votmg weIght)

00 (constant)
OVOLCKER
OMILLER
OBURNS
~CHMDCP (ChaIrman Democratlc
PreSIdent)
~CHMRCP (ChaIrman RepublIcan
PreSIdent)
IndIVIduals' parameters
~ (dIssent threshold parameter)
('(0 (constant)
('(DAP (DemocratIc appomtee)
('(RAP (RepublIcan appomtee)
('(SSAP (supply-sIde appomtee)
Shared parameters
IT (error standard deviatIOn)
~r (lagged funds rate)
~MI (M 1 growth)
~p (mflatIOn)
~IP (mdustrIal productIOn growth)
~u (unemployment)
~DCP (DemocratIc current PreSIdent)
~RCP (RepublIcan current PreSIdent)

01782
-30099
34736
07752
-04826

00869
34946
29447
12260
06215

11/11+
11/1111/11 +
11/11 +
11/11-

4/11+
0/11
0/11

38123

35044

11/11+

2/11+

48320

41234

11/11+

3/11+

21349
1.8981
-08000
-02659
-20194

02168
05346
02574
02734
05544

11/11+
11/11+
11/1110/1111/11-

11/11+
11/11+
9/112/1111/11-

11027
09317
00077
00594
00197
-01240
-07607
-09106

01032
00201
00045
00164
00043
00314
04130
04032

11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/1111/1111/11-

11/11+
11/11+
7/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/116/118/11-

7/11+
0/11

AdditIonal tests of hypotheses
Null hypotheSIS
RejectIOn frequency'
3/11
'1-YI2=O
('(DAP - ('(RAP = 0
10/11
('( RAP - ('(SSAP = 0
11/11
10/11
('(SSAP - ('(DAP = 0
1/11
i3DCP - i3RCP = 0
1/11
~DCP + i3CHMDCP - i3RCP - i3CHMRCP = 0
5/11
OVOLCKER - 0BURNS = 0
6/11
OVOLCKER - OIVIILl ER = 0
0/11
OMILLER - OBURNS = 0
a The level of slgmficallu.> B 0 10

distinctly political, rather than ideological, fashlOn. Political pressures on the Fed vary over time, but it is reasonable to assume that
they most often push in the direction of monetary ease. As
politicians, Presidents are likely to respond to politIcal pressures by
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relaying them to the Fed, and Fed Governors, who are Presidential
appointees, may then be especially responsive in their policymaking behavior. Our results indicating that Governors favor
"easier" policies than Bank Presidents are consistent with the
latter point. Furthermore, political loyalty may lead Governors to
be more sensitive to pressure for low interest rates when they serve
under a President of the same party as their appointing President.
This suggests another modification of the model: allow differences
in the intercepts of "in-party" and "out-party" Governors. To do
so, we add the dummy OUT to the individuals' reaction function.
This variable equals one for Governors appointed by a President of
the out-party and otherwise equals zero.33
The intriguing results of this estimation are presented in
Table V. In all eleven estimations the OUT coefficient was positive
and significantly different from zero. The implication is that
Governors respond to the needs of own-party Presidents by
succumbing to pressures for monetary ease and that they
"sabotage" opposition incumbents by promoting monetary tightness. Thus, the partisan identity of the current President does
seem to matter, but not in the manner predicted by partisan
business cycle models driven by ideological concerns.
The preceding results also offer an appointments-related
explanation for a political monetary policy cycle. When partisan
change occurs, appointees of the preceding administration push for
higher interest rates under the new opposition administration, and
this produces early-term tightness. As time passes, the composition
ofthe Board shifts toward appointees ofthe current President, and
pressures for lower interest rates mount. According to this view,
pre-election ease occurs not because a new election is imminent,
but because the last election is further in the past.34
Thus far, we have found only weak evidence to support the
view that direct Presidential influence generates partisan movements in monetary policy choices. However, Woolley [1984, p. 109]
reports that "there is a substantial consensus that presidents
generally get the monetary policy they want from the Federal
Reserve."35 Together, these findings suggest that Presidential
33 GlVen the focus on pohtIcal loyalty (not Ideology) in thiS argument, we have
considered Reagan as a Repubhcan m defimng thiS variable
34. The conventIOnal argument for pohtIcal monetary cycles contends that an
m?-mment electIon mduces PreSIdential pressures on the Fed for ease, which in turn
stimulates the economy and gratifies voters (cf. note 2)
35. An anonymous Fed official has directly acknowledged that pohtIcal SignalS
are heeded: "We beheve that credit conditIOns are reasonable. We aren't gettmg any
Signals from pohtIcmns
I can't see any reason to deviate from current pohcy"
[Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1980]
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TABLE V
REACTION FUNCTIONS WITH OUT-PARTY E~'FECTS

Parameter /variable

Mean
Mean
standard
SIgn
SIgnIficance
coefficient error frequency frequencya

Chairman's parameters
-y (ChaIrman's votmg weight)

01637
05097
15760
-02360
-09066

01005
10456
28088
10296
0.9900

11/11+
9/11+
10/11+
8/1111/11-

5/11+
0/11
0/11
0/11
1/11-

21393
1.4086
-0.9659
-0.4276
-18281
03681

0.2160
04528
02687
0.2843
05336
01396

11/11 +
11/11+
11/1110/1111/1111/11+

11/11+
11/11+
11/115/1111/1111/11+

11132
09377
0.0081
00630
0.0205
-0.1177
-0.3880
-03462

01062
0.0199
00045
0.0163
00042
00314
02869
02866

11/11+
11/11+
11/11 +
11/11+
11/11+
11/1111/1111/11-

11/11+
11/11+
7/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/113/113/11-

Bo (constant)
BVOLCKER
BMILLER
BBVRNS
IndIVIduals' parameters
A (dIssent threshold parameter)
ao (constant)
aDAP (Democratic appomtee)
aRAP (Republican appomtee)
aSSAP (supply-side appomtee)
aOVT (out-party governor)
Shared parameters
cr (error standard deVIatIOn)
J3r (lagged funds rate)
13M! (M1 growth)
J3p (inflatIOn)
J3IP (industrIal productIOn growth)
J3u (unemployment)
J3DCP (DemocratIc current President)
PRCP (Repubhcan current President)
AddItIonal tests of hypotheses
Null hypothesIs
-y - Y12 = 0
aDAP - aRAP = 0
aRAP - aSSAP = 0
aSSAP - aDAP = 0
J3DCP - J3RCP = 0
BVOLCKER - BBVRNS = 0
BVOLCKER - BMILLER = 0
OMILLER - BBURNS = 0

RejectIon frequencya
3/11
10/11
10/11
5/11
0/11
1/11
0/11
0/11

a The level ofslgmficance 18 010

pressures might be effective wlthout being systematically partisan, a possibility which we investigate in a third extension of our
model.
To investigate this hypothesis, we drop the current President
partisan dummies from the model's reaction functions and replace
them with the SAFER index (Signaling from the Administration to
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the Federal Reserve) described by Havrilesky [1988b, 1993]. The
SAFER index measures Presidential preferences by coding statements made by administration spokesmen and reported in the
financial press. The index is calculated as the monthly sum of Wall
Street Journal articles reporting statements advocating easier
monetary policy (coded 1.0) and tighter monetary policy (coded
-1.0). Our reaction functions employ SAFERt-I. the value of
SAFER calculated for the month preceding the month of the
FOMC meeting. Clearly, the statements coded by SAFER need not
follow consistent partisan patterns; in fact, frequencies of ease and
tightness signals are similar across administrations.
Results for the SAFER-augmented model are reported in
Table VI. In each of the eleven estimations summarized there, the
SAFER coefficient was negative and significantly different from
zero, in accord with the view that monetary policy accommodates
the desires expressed by Presidential signaling. These results
confirm and strengthen those reported by Havrilesky, who found
that SAFER influenced money growth in the 1979-1984 period
[1988b] and the Federal funds rate in the 1964-1991 period [1993].
The results permit us to reconcile our conclusions with the
conventional view that Presidential pressures influence monetary
policy choices, but they also leave an unanswered question. Why
does partisan ideology appear to play an important role in the
appointment of Governors but not in patterns of direct Presidential influence?
V. CONCLUSIONS
U sing a methodology that permits the estimation of individual
reaction function parameters, we have analyzed partisan influences exerted by U. S. Presidents on individual members of the
FOMC. Our results strongly suggest that the power to make
appointments provides an important channel of systematic partisan influence. We find that Democratic appointees favor easier
monetary policies than traditional RepUblicans do, and that supplyside Republicans prefer even easier policies than Democrats do.
Regional Reserve Bank Presidents tend to prefer tighter policies
than the politically appointed Governors.
Evidence of systematic and direct partisan influence of the
current President on Fed Governors is weaker in our estimations,
but this does not imply that Presidents have no direct influence
over the Fed. In this paper we find some evidence of direct
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TABLE VI
REACTION FUNCTIONS INCLUDING THE SAFER INDEX

Mean
Mean
standard
SIgn
SIgnIficance
coefficIent
error
frequency frequencya

Parameter / vanable
ChaIrman's parameters
-y (Chairman's votIng weIght)

01544
-05219
36421
14574
-00827

00896
11998
30447
16479
0.5533

11/11+
8/1111/11+
11/11+
10/11-

2/11+
0/11
1/11+
0/11
0/11

21218
10220
-07373
-03299
-16145

02027
02553
02731
02731
04754

11/11+
11/11+
11/1110/1111/11-

11/11+
11/11+
9/113/1111/11-

11183
0.9462
00077
00494
00120
-01019
-00679

0.0928
00172
00041
00139
00040
00261
00229

11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/1111/11-

11/11+
11/11+
9/11+
11/11+
11/11+
11/1111/11-

llo (constant)
llvOLCKER
bMILLER
llBuRNs
IndIViduals' parameters
A (dIssent threshold parameter)
"'0 (constant)
"'DAP (Democratic appoIntee)
"'RAP (RepublIcan appoilltee)
"'SSAP (supply-sIde appoIntee)
Shared parameters
a (error standard deVIatIOn)
fir (lagged funds rate)
flMI (M1 growth)
flp (InflatIOn)
flIP (Industnal production growth)
flu (unemployment)
flSAFER (signalIng Index)
AddItIonal tests of hypotheses
Null hypothesIs
-Y-Y12=0
"'DAP - "'RAP = 0
"'RAP - asSAP = 0
"'SSAP - "'DAP = 0
llvOLCKER - bBL"RNS = 0
bVOLCKER - llMILLER = 0
llMILLER - llBuRNs = 0

ReJectIon frequency"
1/11
8/11
11/11
9/11
3/11
1/11
1/11

a The level of slgmficance IS 0 10

Reagan-specIfic effects and suggestions that Presidents exert partisan influence through the Chairman. Moreover, Presidential signaling appears to be effective without being either continual or
systematically partisan. 36
36 Havnlesky [1991] notes that sIgnalIng IS Itself sensItive to the state of the
economy and the partIsan compOSItIOn of the Board of Governors, as well as the
shIftIng preferences of PresidentIal admlmstrations For example, signalIng was
persistent during Nixon's first term, Carter's term, and Reagan's first term when
each faced a troubled economy and a Board domillated by out-party appoilltees
However, signalIng fell off durIng Reagan's second term and durIng Gerald Ford's
Interregnum, as economic condItIOns Improved and as the Board came to have a
friendlIer partisan composItIon
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Our analysis also suggests that strategic political motives are
relevant in explaining FOMC voting patterns. Partisan-appointed
Governors desire higher interest rates when serving under a
President of the opposing party than they do when serving under
an own-party President. Given the timing of the appointments
process, this politically motivated behavior could produce an
apparent electoral cycle in monetary policies.
The institutional arrangements governing Federal Reserve
decision-making reflect a balancing of concerns: policymakers
should simultaneously be accountable to the public and be resistant to immediate political pressures. To evaluate the balancing of
those concerns on the basis of empirical evidence requires an
analysis of behavior at the level of individual decision-makers. Our
analysis takes a step in that direction; it confirms the importance of
partisanship in appointments for the conduct of monetary policy.
Further study of the microfoundations of Fed decision-making
may ultimately provide a basis for evaluating different appointment procedures and other proposed institutional changes.

APPENDIX

I:

THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION FOR THE MODEL

Appendix 1 provides the likelihood function for the estimated
model. For each meeting t, assume that we observe two endogenous
variables: a postmeeting interest rate and the vote of a single
FOMC member on the monetary policy directive. We arbitrarily
denote the member whose vote is observed as member i.
We begin by compactly reformulating equations (6) and (7).
Equation (6) can be rewritten as
rt

= Zt'IT + U t ,

where Zt is a vector of exogenous variables, 'IT is a vector of
reduced-form coefficients, and U t is the composite error term:
U t = 'YeOt

+

(1 - 'Y )et ·

Conditions (7) characterizing the probit voting model can be
compactly reformulated as
if W,t8 + V,t > }..,
if W,t8 + V,t < -}..,
if -}.. ~ W,t8 + V,t ~ }..,

then V,t = -1;
then V,t= 1·,
then V,t = O.

Here Wa is a vector of exogenous variables,
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reduced-form coefficients, and V,t is the composite error term:
V,t = ,,(eot

+ (1

- ,,(Yet - e,t·

Let g(ut,v,t) be the joint density of U t and V,t. ThIs density is
bivariate normal with variances and covariance given below:
(A.1a)

a~ = "(2a 2

- "( )2a 2/ N

(A.1b)

a~

- "()2a 2/N

(A.1c)

a~u

+ (1
2
= "(2a + (1
= "(2a 2 + (1

- "()2a

2

+ a2 -

/N -

2(1 - "()a 2/N

(1 - "()a 2 /N.

The joint density of the observed variables, rt and V'I> can be
defined for each of three cases J E {I,II,III}. The joint density
relevant for case J is denoted hJ(rt,v,t).
CASE

I. v,t = -l.

When v,t = -1, then V,t > A - W,tE}, and the joint density hj(rt,vzt)
is given by

A joint density can be expressed as a product of marginal and
conditional densities, enabling us to rewrite this equation as

where
f() is the standard normal density function,
<1>( ) is the standard normal distribution function,

/-Lulu = p(au/au)(rt aul u = (Tu(1 -

CASE

II. V,t

Zt'tT) ,

p2)O 5.

= l.

When v,t = 1, then Va < - A - W,tE), and the joint density hn(rl> V,t)
is given by
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III. V,(

=
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o.

When V,t = 0, then - A - W,(@ :S U,t :S A - W,(0, and the joint
density hnr(rt,V,t) is given by
hm(r(,Vtt )

=

f

"-w,,e
g(rt - Zt'lr,U,t) dU,t
-I\-W,t e

The likelihood function for the sample of T meetings is given
by
T

L

= II [d~hI(rt,va) + d:1hn(rt,v,t) + d:nhm(rt,V,t)],
(=1

where d~, d: I , and d: II are dummy variables, respectively, indicating
which case characterizes observation t. The reduced-form parameters can be expressed as functions of the structural parameters
using the restrictions implied by (5), (7), and (A. 1). Maximum
likelihood estimates of the structural parameters are those values
that maximize L.

APPENDIX

2: SUMMARY OF VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

BURNSt
Dummy variables equal to one for meetings when the
indicated Chairman served; otherwise equal to zero.
MILLERt
VOLCKERt
DAPu
A dummy variable equal to one for Democratic
appointees; otherwise equal to zero.
DCPt
A dummy variable equal to one if the President when
meeting t occurs is a Democrat; otherwise equal to
zero.
The three-month-ahead forecast of the growth rate
of the Federal Reserve's Index of Industrial Production; calculated at time t using information available
in the month prior to meeting t.
The annualized percentage rate of growth of the
money supply; measured as the difference in log Ml
over the two months preceding meeting t.
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A dummy variable equal to one for members appointed by a President of the party not currently
occupying the Presidency; otherwise equal to zero.
The three-month-ahead forecast of the rate of inflation (the annualized percentage rate of change in the
Consumer Price Index); calculated at time t using
information available in the month prior to meetmg

t.

RAP,!

SAFERt - 1

APPENDIX

The average Federal funds rate prevailing in the
interval between meeting t and meeting t + 1.
The average Federal funds rate prevailing in the
interval between meeting t - 1 and meeting t.
A dummy variable equal to one for traditional (i.e.,
non-Reagan) Republican appointees; otherwise equal
to zero.
A dummy variable equal to one if the President when
meeting t occurs is a traditional (non-Reagan) Republican; otherwise equal to zero.
For the month preceding the month in which meeting t occurs, the sum of Wall Street Journal articles
reporting administration statements favoring easier
monetary policy (coded 1.0) and tighter monetary
policy (coded -1.0).
A dummy variable equal to one for supply-side
Republican appomtees (i.e., Reagan appointees), otherwise equal to zero.
The three-month-ahead forecast of the unemployment rate; calculated at time t using information
available m the month prior to meeting t.
A discrete variable indicating the vote of FOMC
member l in meeting t; equal to -1.0 for a dissent
favoring ease, 1.0 for a dissent favoring tightness,
and 0 for an assent.
3:

SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF REDUCED-FoRM
EQUATIONS

As noted in the text, it is possible to estimate the reduced form
given by (6) and (7) with single-equation estimation methods.
Equation (6), explaining the postmeeting Federal funds rate, can
be estimated by ordinary least squares; mequalities (7) can be
estimated as an ordered pro bit model. In Table VII we provide
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reduced-form estimates for the model corresponding to Table I in
the text.
Estimates ofthe OLS equation employ 323 time series observations corresponding to FOMe meetings from 1960-1987 (excluding the 1979-1982 period of nonborrowed reserve targeting). For
the ordered probit model, two sets of estimates are provided. First,
we provide estimates that use data pooled over all 3352 voting
observations. Alternatively, we provide averages of estimates obtained from eleven mutually exclusive subsets of the data, such
that only one vote per meeting is included in each data subset. This
is done because error terms are correlated across members within a
meeting, so that pooling results in a violation of an assumption of
the ordered pro hit model. For the ordered probit model we
normalize by setting au = 1.0 and adopt the sign convention that
TABLE VII
MONETARY POLICY REACTION FU!>(CTIONS WITH PARTISAN INFLUENCES
REDUCED-FoRM OLS AND ORDERED PROBlT ESTIMATES

OLS estimates
equation (6)

VarIable

13123
-00237
01862
06293
-08647
-03662
-2195.8

0.5623
00933
01463
02995
0.5838
05881
0.8871

rt-l
111t-l

09264
00079
00534
0.0185
-01392
-0.1911
-0.1044

00185
0.0046
00144
00041
00320
03354
03376

r

A'
(Tv
(Tu

Averaged ordered
problt estimates
equatlOns (7)

Mean
Standard
Mean
standard
Standard
Coefficient
error
Coefficient
error
coefficient
error

CONSTANT
BURNS
MILLER
VOLCKER
DAP
RAP
SSAP
DAP
RAP
SSAP

IP
(;
DCP
RCP

Pooled ordered
pro bit estimates
equatlOns (7)

02597
-0.1368
-08443
-02583
-15660
-00574
-17454
07715
01013
14675

0.4720
00703
01962
0.1945
09107
09217
12721
0.0872
0.0894
0.2059

01703
-0.1594
-0.7361
-03370
-14698
01104
-12608
08055
01365
1.4159

1.5767
02478
0.5389
0.5752
30471
30798
39649
02995
03116
05396

1.9571
10000

00379

20515
10000

01393

03540
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the underlying latent variable should be interpreted as a "propensity to dissent favoring monetary ease." In Table VII, A. is the
threshold parameter for the reduced-form ordered pro bit model,
and O"u and <Tv are standard deviations for the error terms for (6) and
(7).
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DUKE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE
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